Abstract (may include machine translation)
There is wide agreement that children have human rights, and that their human rights differ from those of adults. What explains this difference which is, at least at first glance, puzzling, given that human rights are meant to be universal? The puzzle can be dispelled by identifying what unites children’s and adults’ rights as human rights. Here I seek to answer the question of children’s human rights – that is, rights they have merely in virtue of being human and of being children – by exploring how children’s interests are different from adults’, and how respect for children’s and adults’ moral status yields different practical requirements. If human rights protect interests, then children have many, but not all, of the human rights of adults, and, in addition, have some human rights that adults lack. I discuss the way in which children’s human rights, as I conceive of them here are, or fail to be, reflected in the law; as an illustration, I use the most important legal document listing children’s rights, namely the 1989 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Title of host publication | The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Human Rights |
| Editors | Jesse Tomalty, Kerri Woods |
| Publisher | Taylor and Francis |
| Pages | 183-495 |
| Number of pages | 313 |
| ISBN (Electronic) | 9781040401798 |
| ISBN (Print) | 9781032221380 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - 2025 |