Abstract (may include machine translation)
David Malament tried to show that the causal theory of time leads to a unique determination of simultaneity relative to an inertial observer, namely standard simultaneity. I show that the causal relation Malament uses in his proofs, causal connectibility, should be replaced by a different causal relation, the one used by Reichenbach in his formulation of the theory. I also explain why Malament's reliance on the assumption that the observer has an eternal inertial history modifies our conception of simultaneity, and I therefore eliminate it. Having made these changes, Malament's uniqueness result no longer follows, although the conventionality of simultaneity is not reinstated. I contrast my approach with previous criticisms of Malament.
Original language | English |
---|---|
Pages (from-to) | 459-479 |
Number of pages | 21 |
Journal | British Journal for the Philosophy of Science |
Volume | 57 |
Issue number | 3 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Sep 2006 |