TY - JOUR
T1 - Categories and Constraints in Causal Perception
AU - Kominsky, Jonathan F.
AU - Strickland, Brent
AU - Wertz, Annie E.
AU - Elsner, Claudia
AU - Wynn, Karen
AU - Keil, Frank C.
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2017, © The Author(s) 2017.
PY - 2017/11/1
Y1 - 2017/11/1
N2 - When object A moves adjacent to a stationary object, B, and in that instant A stops moving and B starts moving, people irresistibly see this as an event in which A causes B to move. Real-world causal collisions are subject to Newtonian constraints on the relative speed of B following the collision, but here we show that perceptual constraints on the relative speed of B (which align imprecisely with Newtonian principles) define two categories of causal events in perception. Using performance-based tasks, we show that triggering events, in which B moves noticeably faster than A, are treated as being categorically different from launching events, in which B does not move noticeably faster than A, and that these categories are unique to causal events (Experiments 1 and 2). Furthermore, we show that 7- to 9-month-old infants are sensitive to this distinction, which suggests that this boundary may be an early-developing component of causal perception (Experiment 3).
AB - When object A moves adjacent to a stationary object, B, and in that instant A stops moving and B starts moving, people irresistibly see this as an event in which A causes B to move. Real-world causal collisions are subject to Newtonian constraints on the relative speed of B following the collision, but here we show that perceptual constraints on the relative speed of B (which align imprecisely with Newtonian principles) define two categories of causal events in perception. Using performance-based tasks, we show that triggering events, in which B moves noticeably faster than A, are treated as being categorically different from launching events, in which B does not move noticeably faster than A, and that these categories are unique to causal events (Experiments 1 and 2). Furthermore, we show that 7- to 9-month-old infants are sensitive to this distinction, which suggests that this boundary may be an early-developing component of causal perception (Experiment 3).
KW - causality
KW - infant development
KW - naive physics
KW - open data
KW - open materials
KW - perception
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85033216454&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1177/0956797617719930
DO - 10.1177/0956797617719930
M3 - Article
C2 - 28956971
AN - SCOPUS:85033216454
SN - 0956-7976
VL - 28
SP - 1649
EP - 1662
JO - Psychological Science
JF - Psychological Science
IS - 11
ER -