Abstract (may include machine translation)
O artigo argumenta que, apesar da retórica utilizada por seus ministros, a permeabilidade social do Supremo Tribunal Federal opera de maneira seletiva, impedindo o acesso de certos grupos ao tribunal ao mesmo tempo em que o franqueia a outros. Essa seletividade social se manifesta por meio de diversos mecanismos formais e informais amparados em regras processuais e regimentais e em práticas procedimentais aparentemente neutras. O artigo analisa dois desses mecanismos, que são pouco ou nada debatidos pela literatura nacional: a jurisprudência restritiva acerca das entidades autorizadas a proporem ações no controle abstrato de constitucionalidade e a prática de audiências informais privadas entre advogados e partes e ministros, conhecidas como “despachos”. A distribuição desigual das vias de acesso ao STF vai de encontro não apenas à noção de acesso à justiça, mas também às ideias de igualdade, democracia e, no limite, do próprio Estado de Direito.
The paper claims that, despite the rhetoric of its justices, the social permeability of the Brazilian Supreme Court is selective: access to the court is provided to certain social groups, but not to others. The social selectivity of the court operates through formal and informal mechanisms based on procedural rules that are seemingly neutral. The article analyzes two of such mechanisms that are barely (or not at all) addressed by existing scholarship: the restrictive case law on standing to bring abstract constitutional review challenges, and the practice of informal private hearings between attorneys, parties, and justices, known as despachos. The paper argues that the unequal distribution of access to the court goes against the ideas of access to justice, equality, democracy and the rule of law itself.
The paper claims that, despite the rhetoric of its justices, the social permeability of the Brazilian Supreme Court is selective: access to the court is provided to certain social groups, but not to others. The social selectivity of the court operates through formal and informal mechanisms based on procedural rules that are seemingly neutral. The article analyzes two of such mechanisms that are barely (or not at all) addressed by existing scholarship: the restrictive case law on standing to bring abstract constitutional review challenges, and the practice of informal private hearings between attorneys, parties, and justices, known as despachos. The paper argues that the unequal distribution of access to the court goes against the ideas of access to justice, equality, democracy and the rule of law itself.
Translated title of the contribution | Invisible Gates: Private Hearings, Standing and the Selective Social Permeability of the Brazilian Supreme Court |
---|---|
Original language | Portuguese |
Pages (from-to) | 55-82 |
Journal | Revista Estudos Institucionais |
Volume | 6 |
Issue number | 1 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - 25 Apr 2020 |
Externally published | Yes |
Keywords
- Judicial Review
- Due Process
- Social Permeability
- Social Selectivity
- Private hearing