Cambridge changes revisited: Why certain relational changes are indispensable

David Weberman*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract (may include machine translation)

Peter Geach and others suppose that change in an object's relational properties absent any change in its intrinsic properties (relational change) is not a genuine change in that object but only a."mere Cambridge change." I explain and reject two strategies challenging Geach's position. I then present my own argument against Geach which depends on the recognition of entities identified in terms of their emergent properties, i.e. properties not reducible to physical properties. I provide some examples of such entities (social phenomena, historical events, artworks) and address the problem of finding a criterion for distinguishing genuine from nongenuine change.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)139-149
Number of pages11
JournalDialectica
Volume53
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - 1999
Externally publishedYes

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