Belief May Not Be a Necessary Condition for Knowledge

Katalin Farkas

doi:10.1007/s10670-014-9620-2

Belief May Not Be a Necessary Condition for Knowledge

Katalin Farkas^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Department of Philosophy

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract (may include machine translation)

Most discussions in epistemology assume that believing that p is a necessary condition for knowing that p. In this paper, I will present some considerations that put this view into doubt. The candidate cases for knowledge without belief are the kind of cases that are usually used to argue for the so-called ‘extended mind’ thesis.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	185-200
Number of pages	16
Journal	Erkenntnis
Volume	80
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-014-9620-2
State	Published - 2014

Access to Document

10.1007/s10670-014-9620-2

Cite this

@article{119506b246834b92bdb13c7435adcd2f,

title = "Belief May Not Be a Necessary Condition for Knowledge",

abstract = "Most discussions in epistemology assume that believing that p is a necessary condition for knowing that p. In this paper, I will present some considerations that put this view into doubt. The candidate cases for knowledge without belief are the kind of cases that are usually used to argue for the so-called {\textquoteleft}extended mind{\textquoteright} thesis.",

author = "Katalin Farkas",

year = "2014",

doi = "10.1007/s10670-014-9620-2",

language = "English",

volume = "80",

pages = "185--200",

journal = "Erkenntnis",

issn = "0165-0106",

publisher = "Springer Netherlands",

number = "1",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Belief May Not Be a Necessary Condition for Knowledge

AU - Farkas, Katalin

PY - 2014

Y1 - 2014

N2 - Most discussions in epistemology assume that believing that p is a necessary condition for knowing that p. In this paper, I will present some considerations that put this view into doubt. The candidate cases for knowledge without belief are the kind of cases that are usually used to argue for the so-called ‘extended mind’ thesis.

AB - Most discussions in epistemology assume that believing that p is a necessary condition for knowing that p. In this paper, I will present some considerations that put this view into doubt. The candidate cases for knowledge without belief are the kind of cases that are usually used to argue for the so-called ‘extended mind’ thesis.

UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/84897119810

U2 - 10.1007/s10670-014-9620-2

DO - 10.1007/s10670-014-9620-2

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:84897119810

SN - 0165-0106

VL - 80

SP - 185

EP - 200

JO - Erkenntnis

JF - Erkenntnis

IS - 1

ER -

Belief May Not Be a Necessary Condition for Knowledge

Abstract (may include machine translation)

Access to Document

Other files and links

Fingerprint

Cite this