Belief May Not Be a Necessary Condition for Knowledge

Katalin Farkas*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract (may include machine translation)

Most discussions in epistemology assume that believing that p is a necessary condition for knowing that p. In this paper, I will present some considerations that put this view into doubt. The candidate cases for knowledge without belief are the kind of cases that are usually used to argue for the so-called ‘extended mind’ thesis.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)185-200
Number of pages16
JournalErkenntnis
Volume80
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - 2014

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