Banking and Fiscal Union in Europe: A Solution or a Trap?

Research output: Contribution to Book/Report typesChapterpeer-review

Abstract (may include machine translation)

This paper addresses the insoluable conflict between the letter and spirit of the Lisbon Treaty/TEU 2009 on the one hand and the not-so-creeping supranationalism, that has emerged from a series of crisis-manging measures at the Community level in 2008-2015, on the other. While the TEU is firmly grounded in intergovernmen-talism, the series of ad-hoc innovations translate into an ever-growing supranationalism. The latter is expressed in a programmatic fashion in the Juncker Note of February, 2015. The latter implies a qualitative change in the nature of the EU as we had known before, which was known to be a community of nation-states. The global financial crisis of 2007-2009 and the still looming debt and confidence crises of the EU have triggered a series of measures aimed at pre-empting worse-case scenarios and creating up until now non-existent firefighting mechanisms at the Community level. At the end of the day, federalist arrangements, that have seemed to stand no chance of implementation even a decade ago, have become reality by now. Banking and Fiscal Union/BFU is a done deal –agreed upon at the December 13-14 2012 Council. The only open question is the precise mechanisms of their implementation on the ground.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationNationalstaat und Europäische Union
EditorsAnthony B. Atkinson, Peter M. Huber, Harold James, Fritz W. Scharpf
PublisherNomos
Pages109-122
Number of pages14
ISBN (Print)9783848717095
DOIs
StatePublished - 2016

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'Banking and Fiscal Union in Europe: A Solution or a Trap?'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this