Attending, acting, and feeling together

Michael Schmitz*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract (may include machine translation)

In this paper, I argue that basic forms of collective intentionality such as those involved in atttending, acting and feeling with others essentially involve experiencing and understanding others as co-subjects, that their content is nonconceptual, and that they represent co-subjects and their positions at a level that is prior to the mind-body differentiation.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1983-2002
Number of pages20
JournalPhilosophical Psychology
Volume38
Issue number5
DOIs
StatePublished - 4 Jul 2025
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • Collective intentionality
  • Force/mode
  • Joint action
  • Joint attention
  • Joint emotion
  • Nonconceptual content

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