Abstract (may include machine translation)
This paper argues against dismissing the Principle of Alternative Possibilities merely on the ground of so-called Frankfurt-style cases. Its main claims are that the interpretation of such cases depends on which substantive theory of responsibility one endorses and that Frankfurt-style cases all involve some form of causal overdetermination which can be interpreted either as being compatible with the potentially manipulated agent’s ability to act otherwise or as a responsibility undermining constraint. The paper also argues that the possibility of such scenarios can support the truth of classical compatibilism as much as the truth of semicompatibilism.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 193-217 |
Number of pages | 25 |
Journal | Disputatio |
Volume | 9 |
Issue number | 45 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - 2017 |
Keywords
- Abilities
- Freedom
- Overdetermination
- Possibilities
- Preemption