Alternative possibilities and causal overdetermination

Ferenc Huoranszki*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalReview Articlepeer-review

Abstract (may include machine translation)

This paper argues against dismissing the Principle of Alternative Possibilities merely on the ground of so-called Frankfurt-style cases. Its main claims are that the interpretation of such cases depends on which substantive theory of responsibility one endorses and that Frankfurt-style cases all involve some form of causal overdetermination which can be interpreted either as being compatible with the potentially manipulated agent’s ability to act otherwise or as a responsibility undermining constraint. The paper also argues that the possibility of such scenarios can support the truth of classical compatibilism as much as the truth of semicompatibilism.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)193-217
Number of pages25
JournalDisputatio
Volume9
Issue number45
DOIs
StatePublished - 2017

Keywords

  • Abilities
  • Freedom
  • Overdetermination
  • Possibilities
  • Preemption

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