Agency Independence, Campaign Contributions, and Favoritism in US Federal Government Contracting

Mihály Fazekas^*
, Romain Ferrali
, Johannes Wachs

^*Corresponding author for this work

Department of Public Policy

Aix-Marseille Université
Vienna University of Economics and Business
Complexity Science Hub Vienna

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

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Replication Data for: Agency independence, campaign contributions, and favouritism in US federal government contracting
Fazekas, M. (Creator), Ferrali, R. (Creator), Wachs, J. (Creator) & Wachs, J. (Contributor), Harvard Dataverse, 2022
DOI: 10.7910/dvn/3u07ee, https://dataverse.harvard.edu/citation?persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/3U07EE
Dataset