Skip to main navigation Skip to search Skip to main content

A theory of debt maturity and innovation

  • Yuliyan Mitkov
  • University of Bonn

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract (may include machine translation)

The financing of innovative firms must balance two competing goals. First, the entrepreneur must be adequately protected from failure to encourage innovation. However, if the attempt to innovate fails, the entrepreneur's firm should be liquidated and its assets redeployed elsewhere. Meeting these two goals is inherently challenging when contracts are incomplete and shaped by ex-post renegotiation. I investigate how firms can choose the maturity of their debt to motivate innovation. The theory highlights a novel interaction between low-powered incentives, renegotiation, and debt maturity.

Original languageEnglish
Article number105828
Number of pages18
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
Volume218
DOIs
StatePublished - Jun 2024
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • Debt
  • Incomplete contracts
  • Innovation
  • Renegotiation

Cite this