Abstract (may include machine translation)
The financing of innovative firms must balance two competing goals. First, the entrepreneur must be adequately protected from failure to encourage innovation. However, if the attempt to innovate fails, the entrepreneur's firm should be liquidated and its assets redeployed elsewhere. Meeting these two goals is inherently challenging when contracts are incomplete and shaped by ex-post renegotiation. I investigate how firms can choose the maturity of their debt to motivate innovation. The theory highlights a novel interaction between low-powered incentives, renegotiation, and debt maturity.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Article number | 105828 |
| Number of pages | 18 |
| Journal | Journal of Economic Theory |
| Volume | 218 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Jun 2024 |
| Externally published | Yes |
Keywords
- Debt
- Incomplete contracts
- Innovation
- Renegotiation
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