A realistic view on normative conflicts

Daniela Glavaničová, Matteo Pascucci

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract (may include machine translation)

Kulicki and Trypuz (2016) introduced three systems of multivalued deontic action logic to handle normative conflicts. The first system suggests a pessimistic view on normative conflicts, according to which any conflicting option represents something forbidden; the second system suggests an optimistic view, according to which any conflicting option represents something obligatory; finally, the third system suggests a neutral view, according to which any conflicting option represents something that is neither obligatory nor forbidden. The aim of the present paper is to propose a fourth system in this family, which comes with a realistic view on normative conflicts: a normative conflict remains unsolved unless it is generated by two or more normative sources that can be compared. In accordance with this, we will provide a more refined formal framework for the family of systems at issue, which allows for explicit reference to sources of norms. Conflict resolution is thus a consequence of a codified hierarchy of normative sources.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)447-462
Number of pages16
JournalLogic and Logical Philosophy
Volume29
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - Sep 2020
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • Action
  • Deontic logic
  • Deontic value
  • Multivalued logic
  • Normative conflict

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