A Puzzle About Free Speech, Legitimacy, and Countermajoritarian Constraints

Zoltan Miklosi*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract (may include machine translation)

This paper argues that there is a tension between two central features of Dworkin's partnership conception of democracy. The conception holds, on the one hand, that it is a necessary condition of the legitimacy of the decisions of a political majority that every member of the political community has a very robust right to publicly criticize those decisions. A plausible interpretation of this argument is that free political speech constitutes a normatively privileged vehicle for political minorities to become majorities, and therefore in the absence of freedom of speech minorities could not be rightfully compelled to comply with majority decisions. On the other hand, the partnership conception holds that properly exercised constraints on majority rule do not incur any moral costs. The no-moral-costs thesis is argued for on the basis that nothing of significance is lost when individuals' influence on political decisions is diminished. However, the legitimacy argument for free speech assumes the significance of individual political influence, which the no-moral-costs thesis denies. Hence the tension.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)27-43
Number of pages17
JournalRes Publica
Volume20
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Feb 2014

Keywords

  • Countermajoritarian constraints
  • Dworkin
  • Free speech
  • Legitimacy

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